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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine being fired for refusing to sing Happy Birthday. Now imagine col-
lecting $53,000 for that firing-from a waitressing job. Science fiction? Not
exactly. Try religious discrimination in the workplace-1990s style. 1 Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has long proscribed such treatment, but lawsuits claim-
ing this type of workplace discrimination were relatively rare for many years. Now
claims are on the rise, up 18% over the past five years, and the substance of reli-
gious discrimination claims is changing to include some unprecedented fact pat-
terns.2 This new activity in employment discrimination law, as well as the grow-
ing likelihood that employers will opt for sometimes costly settlements to avoid
the risk, cost, and bad publicity of a trial, seem to reflect a trend toward greater
demands on employers to accommodate workers' increasingly diverse religious
beliefs. 3 This trend will likely result in a continued increase in workplace reli-
gious discrimination lawsuits in the next decade, but, ironically, will ultimately
lead to diminished litigation of this type. This Article details where the law is in
this area and predicts where it is headed by examining recent statutory, administra-
tive, and constitutional law developments.
II. STATUTORY LAW: FROM TITLE VII TO THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the source of the federal prohibi-
tion of workplace religious discrimination. 4 The statute includes religion in its
laundry list of forbidden reasons for business decisions:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 5
Religion, however, warranted additional statutory language beyond that applicable
to race, color, sex, or national origin:
* Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts; B.A. Harvard Uni-
versity, M.A. University of Liverpool, J.D. Boston University.
1. See Mark Hansen, Suing Bosses Over Beliefs, A.B.A.J. April 1998, at 30 (detailing 1993
case and subsequent settlement).
2. See id. (citing EEOC statistics demonstrating an increase from 1,444 claims in 1993 to
1,709 in 1997, in contrast to an overall decrease in EEOC complaints during the same period
from 87,942 to 80,625, and detailing other "unusual employment-related suit[s]").
3. See id. (quoting Lynn Mitchell, resident scholar of religion at the University of Houston).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. 6
This language, added by amendment in 1972, provided a statutory require-
ment that employers "reasonably accommodate" employees' religious practices,
even when these might somehow impact an employee's ability to do thejob. For
example, an employee whose religious observances prevent him from working on
Friday evenings might nonetheless be able to serve as a payroll clerk simply by
moving the time of paycheck distribution from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Friday at
noon. Similarly, a Catholic school might avoid its traditional policy of hiring only
Catholic teachers by arranging someone's schedule to teach only math classes.
One might read this 1972 language as a limitation to the "business necessity"
and "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defenses otherwise available
to employers under Title VII. 8 The "business necessity" defense arises in "dispar-
ate impact" cases, when a facially neutral job requirement or policy impacts dis-
proportionately on a group protected by Title VII. In such a case-illustrated by
the payroll clerk whose job responsibilities include distributing payroll on Fridays
at 5:00 p.m.-the employer may defend itself by demonstrating that the facially
neutral job requirement is justified by a business necessity.9 Similarly, BFOQ is
the standard defense in a disparate treatment case, that is, one where employment
rules or decisions explicitly treat an employee or a group of employees protected
by Title VII less favorably than others. In this type of case, typified by a Catholic
school's explicit policy to hire only Catholics as teachers,
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and cm-
ploy employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particu-
lar business or enterprise.10
While requiring that employers accommodate employee religious beliefs in
these situations might appear to undermine the two statutory defenses, judicial
interpretation of the term "undue hardship"--the statutory limitation on the ac-
commodation requirement-has counterbalanced this effect by affording employ-
ers an additional defense in religious discrimination cases. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that an employer may justify a refusal to accommodate an employee's
religious practices by demonstrating that to do so requires anything more than a
minimal effort or expense.11
In TWA v. Hardison,12 an employee whose religious beliefs prohibited him
from working on Saturdays sued when the airline refused to violate a seniority
system established by a collective bargaining agreement in order to accommodate
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
7. See 29 C.ER. § 1605.2 (1998).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994).
9. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
11. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
12. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
the employee's need to have Saturdays off.13 The Court held that violating that
collective bargaining agreement would have constituted an "undue hardship" un-
der the 1972 amendment to Title VII, stating that
[i]t would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommodation" Con-
gress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preferences of some
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accom-
modate or prefer the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII
does not require an employer to go that far.14
Thus, in the hypothetical examples set out above, a showing that accommodation
would necessitate rearranging the schedules of off-site workers to change payroll
distribution to noon, or that it would require causing other teachers to teach extra
religion classes to accommodate for the non-Catholic math teacher might well
suffice as legal excuses not to accommodate these two workers' religious obser-
vances and beliefs.
In contrast, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which contains a similar
"accommodation unless undue hardship" rule, statutorily set a much stricter stan-
dard for indulgence of the "undue hardship" defense in disability discrimination
cases: "The term 'undue hardship' means an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense...." 15 This language has led to the introduction of a proposed piece of
legislation, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) which seeks to up-
grade the Title VII "accommodation" and "undue hardship" definitions to the level
of the ADA. 16 Pending passage of the WRFA, however, cases will continue to be
resolved based on the current judicial construction of the original statutory balanc-
ing test. This construction allows for successful employer defenses based on rela-
tively weak showings of hardship, though employees do prevail at times.
A. The "Easy" Cases: Garb, Hair, Holidays
The traditional religious discrimination case involves a religious employee
who is negatively impacted by the rules or policies of her employer because of her
religious beliefs or practices. She is not hired because she will not wear a skimpy
uniform due to her religious belief that women should keep their legs and head
covered at all times. 17 Alternatively, an employee is denied a promotion to a desk
job because he refuses to cut his hair due to his belief that men must wear long
braids to express their reverence for God. 18 Perhaps an employee is fired because
he will not work past sundown on Friday afternoons due to his belief that one
13. See id.
14. Id. at 81.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
16. H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1997). See also Dan Coats, Workplace Religious
Freedom Act, Congressional Press Releases (Oct. 21, 1997); Hansen, supra note 1, at 32 (dis-
cussing goals of bill).
17. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-2620 (1971) (unlawful employment practice for em-
ployer to discharge Black Muslim woman due to her manner of dress).
18. See, e.g., Carter v. Bruce Oaldey, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Ark. 1993); Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Elec. Data Sys., No. C83-15 IC, 1983 WL 464 (W.D. Feb. 14,
Wash. 1983).
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ought not work on the Sabbath. 19 These sorts of cases continue to arise. Their
increased number is largely a reflection of two phenomena: Americans are in-
creasingly comfortable asserting their civil rights in the workplace as jobs are less
difficult to obtain20 and religious observance is more popularly accepted,2 1 and
the variety of religious beliefs represented in the workplace is increasing as the
population grows more diverse.22
1. Traditional Beliefs Demanding More Respect
In 1993, a federal court ruled in favor of a Jewish laborer who claimed reli-
gious discrimination when he was fired for refusing to trim his beard based on
religious beliefs.2 3 In that case, the unskilled laborer repeatedly refused to honor
the company's "no beard" policy, and challenged his subsequent dismissal by ques-
tioning the reasons for the underlying policy and its inflexibility.2 4 The plaintiff
succeeded in convincing the judge that his beard was neither unsafe nor unprofes-
sional and, thus, its existence did not create an "undue hardship" on his employer.25
Although grooming practices which hinder the employer's operation or conflict
directly with health and safety regulations may be the basis for a successful "un-
due hardship" defense 2 6 the employer's defense of its "no beard" policy as family
tradition fell short of a justification for refusing to accommodate the employee's
religious beliefs. 27
This type of case is far from new or unique,2 8 but its increasing occurrence
typifies the increasing willingness of employees to assert their rights to express
and to observe their religious beliefs in the workplace. It also illustrates that em-
ployers may have been lulled into a false sense of security by precedents allowing
minimal hardship to suffice as an employer defense. Even under the current stan-
dard employees can and do prevail.2 9 Employers who rely on the historically easy
undue hardship defense are increasingly startled when courts rule that not just any
minor inconvenience constitutes such a hardship. 30
Plaintiff success encourages other employees to assert their rights. In addi-
tion, the rise in popular acceptance of participation in religious services and activi-
ties31 and the strengthening economy32 also have emboldened workers to risk as-
19. See, e.g., Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving Seventh
Day Adventist whose religion prohibited work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday put
on night shift and fired for refusal to work). See also Eric Matusewitch, Employee Challenges
to Religion-Based Dress Increase, 12 EuwwmOEwrLmG. RE'. 3 (1998), available in WESTLAW,
12 No. 8 RNEMPLR 3 (summarizing both classic and recent garb and hair cases).
20. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 30.
21. See Dominic Bencivenga, Religion at Work: When Accommodation Becomes Harass-
ment, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 11, 1997, at 5.
22. See id.
23. See Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 676.
24. See id
25. See id
26. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron, 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).
27. See Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 675.
28. See generally Matusewitch, supra note 19.
29. See id
30. See Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. at 675- 76.
31. See Bencivenga, supra note 21, at 5.
32. See id
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serting their rights in the workplace. Witness the two Massachusetts women who
sued their employer, a racetrack, over having to work on Christmas. 33 The race-
track, which generated its largest attendance, and thus profits, on weekends and
holidays, had a longstanding practice to remain open on Christmas. This necessi-
tated some employees-usually those with the least seniority or those who had not
worked the previous Christmas-to work part of the day. The women, who were
only scheduled to work the evening shift, sued when they were fired for refusing to
work the assigned shift.34
Employers long have struggled with the many requests for time off on reli-
gious holidays observed by large numbers of employees. 35 It is simply not always
possible to honor every worker's request. Typically, employers will attempt to
stagger holiday schedules, to offer unpaid leaves, voluntary shift swapping, or
even the use of temporary workers as substitutes.3 6 Yet, some employees must
work. This was once accepted as inevitable, especially by employees with little
seniority. Today, in a workplace-rights-oriented age, practices once tolerated by
workers are now challenged with regularity.
2. Non-traditional Beliefs Surfacing
Where traditional Catholic headdress was once the topic of reasonable ac-
commodation claims,37 today Muslim women are challenging suspensions, termi-
nations, and refusals of employment for wearing religious head scarves.38 The
Chi Chi's waitress who challenged her termination for refusing to sing Happy Birth-
day to a customer asserted a Jehovah's Witness's belief that prohibits the celebra-
tion of birthdays.39 Employers who are accommodating of the beliefs and prac-
tices of "mainstream" religions nonetheless find themselves being sued by em-
ployees with less well known beliefs.
This result can be partially attributed to managers who do not accept unfamil-
iar religious beliefs as legitimate.4 0 Thus, despite a company policy that advo-
cates the respect for and accommodation of religious beliefs and that provides for
training on this issue, managers often think that they are honoring company policy
33. See Pielech v. Massosoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (Mass. 1996). See also
Barbara Ettorre, Religion in the Workplace: Implications for Managers, Management Review
15 (Dec. 1996) (discussing case and state court ruling against plaintiffs on state law grounds).
34. This case was brought under a Massachusetts statute rather than under Title VII. The
statute, which sought to protect individuals by giving them the right to be free from work on
days of religious observance, was ruled unconstitutional by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. The ruling leaves open the question of whether the racetrack violated Title VII. See
Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d at 1300.
35. See Juggling Workers During the Holidays (Dec. 4, 1996) <http://www.aclu.org/news/
W120496a.html>; Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Accommodation of Religious Obser-
vances, Parts I and 1I, N.Y. L.J. Feb. 3, 1997 and Mar. 19, 1997.
36. See Juggling Workers During the Holidays, supra note 35; Klein & Pappas, supra note
35.
37. See Matusewitch supra note 19, at I (discussing 1970 EEOC decision involving an "Old
Catholic" nurse who insisted that her religion required her to keep her head covered at all times).
38. Laurie Goldstein, Islamic Emblem of Faith Also Trigger for Bias, N.Y. TiMaS, Nov. 3,
1997 (discussing claims against Taco Bell, Domino's Pizza, J.C. Penney, Holiday Inn, and Of-
fice Depot).
39. See Hansen, supra note I, at 30.
40. See Ettorre, supra note 33, at 15-18.
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while in actuality they are favoring the requests of members of traditional reli-
gions over those of others.4 1 This has led to a second tier of cases involving tradi-
tional claims-i.e., those pertaining to garb, hair, or holiday observances- arising
due to the practice of non-traditional beliefs. For example, a Sikh with a beard'4 2
a Mohawk male with long hair,43 and a Rastafarian with dreadlocks44 all have
been successful in challenging employer hair policies resulting in their being fired
or refused employment. Such cases may be the biggest current pitfall for employ-
ers.
3. Predictions
Employees in a good economy are more likely to risk their jobs by asserting
their rights. Add to this a culture where religious observance is on the upswing,
and it appears that American workers are likely to continue to assert in increasing
numbers their right to have their religious beliefs and practices accommodated in
the workplace. This is especially true in the face of the likely passage of the bipar-
tisan-sponsored WRFA.4 5 The new statute would effectively override the Supreme
Court's Hardison standard for undue hardship, requiring instead that employers
accommodate religious beliefs absent a showing of significant-rather than mini-
mal--difficulty or expense.46
Ironically, the actual number of lawsuits may nonetheless decrease in the first
years of the new millennium. This will be a result of heightened employer aware-
ness of the accommodation requirement created by: a) the press that will likely be
generated by increased and unusual lawsuits; b) the passage of the WRFA along
with the press and legal advice attendant to that passage; and c) prolonged expo-
sure to more diverse religious views in the workplace. Additionally, there will be
a growing employer awareness of the costs of defending Title VII lawsuits of any
variety, including direct litigation costs, growing jury awards, and the indirect
monetary impact of bad press.4 7 Ultimately, the current trend is likely to diminish,
not because workers become less demanding, but rather because employers be-
come more accommodating-both initially and in the face of a threatened lawsuit.
B. The "Difficult" Cases: Religious Symbols, Speech, and Proselytizing
The more challenging religious discrimination cases for both employers and
the courts have been those where a religious employee's workplace expression of
a religious belief annoys or offends other employees to the extent that the bothered
employees demand action.48 An employee insists on wearing a button graphically
41. See ad
42. See Matusewitch, supra note 19 (discussing 1996 case before the Maryland Human Re-
lations Commission Appeals Board).
43. See Rourke v. State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994).
44. Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
45. H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997) (bill sponsored by conservative Republican Indiana Sen.
Dan Coats and liberal Democrat Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry). See also Coats. supra note
16; Hansen, supra note I (discussing goals and bi-party sponsorship of bill).
46. See iUL
47. See Hansen, supra note 1.
48. See Bencivenga, supra note 21.
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depicting an aborted fetus as part of her religious beliefs. Other employees claim
that this action constitutes religious harassment and demand that the employer
intervene. 4 9 The employer is caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place
because requiring the employee to remove her button may result in litigation by
her, whereas inaction may result in litigation from the complaining employees. 50
These situations are exacerbated when the religious expression comes from a
supervisor. An employee complains that her supervisor repeatedly proselytizes to
her, telling her daily that unless she accepts Jesus as her personal savior she will be
forever damned. This employee fears that her continued refusal to attend her
supervisor's church services and convert is preventing her promotion to a higher
position within the company.5 1 Ultimately, she is fired and brings a claim alleging
religious discrimination. 52 The Seventh Circuit found that such a situation consti-
tuted an actionable claim under Title VII as a form of religious harassment, pre-
sumed by that court to be every bit as illegal under Title VII as sexual harass-
ment.5
3
Finally, what if the employer is the government? Although Title VII may
protect one from discrimination for expressing religious views, one's First Amend-
ment free speech rights (about religion or anything else) may be legally limited in
a private workplace. 54 In contrast, the government has a direct obligation to avoid
the abridgement of free speech, and, additionally to avoid interference with the
exercise of one's religious beliefs. 55 Suppose that a federal employee's religion
requires that he actively seek to convert others to his beliefs. Interference with
such an employee's religious speech may violate both the Free Speech and the
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 5 6 However, tolerance of that speech, in
addition to subjecting other employees to statutorily illegal harassment, may vio-
late the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if the proselytizing em-
ployee is perceived by other employees or the public as expressing official views.57
1. Private Workplace Cases
A federal appeals court upheld a ruling in favor of the employer in the case of
the graphic fetus button.58 The employee plaintiff, a Catholic who was fired after
refusing to cover or to remove the offending button while at work, claimed that she
had taken a religious vow to wear the button until there was an end to abortion and
that the firing constituted an illegal refusal to reasonably accommodate that be-
49. See Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
50. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
51. See Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 1997).
52. See id. at 964-65.
53. The court presumes that religious, like sexual, harassment is illegal in both the quid pro
quo and hostile environment varieties and concludes that evidence of both types is present in
this case. See id. at 975-77.
54. See Bencivenga, supra note 21.
55. See id.
56. See U.S. CON T. amend. I.
57. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS ExERciss
AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE FEDERAL WORLACE, § 2(F) (1997) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]
(contemplating the type of situation described).
58. See Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
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lief.59 The employer claimed it had offered a reasonable accommodation in ask-
ing plaintiff to merely cover the button at work and also claimed that it would
create an undue hardship to allow the plaintiff to continue to wear the button un-
covered since this already had caused substantial disruption and threats from co-
workers to walk off the job.60 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the employer.6 1
The ruling is predictable under the current low standard for undue hardship but
might be less clearcut if WFRA raises that standard. 62
Although such cases in the private sector are on the rise63 and may produce
more plaintiff victories if WFRA is passed, their resolution seems tied to the same
analysis as the religious garb and holiday cases: one's belief in the obligation to
speak about one's religious views must be accommodated unless it creates an un-
due hardship. The added nuance is simply that accommodation of the proselytiz-
ing employee's religious practice of preaching or attempting to convert-in addi-
tion to whatever direct costs this may entail-risks claims of harassment by other
employees. As indicated by the Eighth Circuit, this risk may itself constitute an
undue hardship.64
2. Public Workplace Cases
A nurse is fired for telling an AIDS patient that her religious belief is that
homosexuality is wrong.65 A government social worker is fired from a family
services job for stating that his Christian beliefs prohibit him from placing foster
children with openly gay couples. 66 Unless these remarks have created an undue
hardship, the employer must tolerate them, right? Not necessarily: when the fir-
ing employer is the state of Connecticut or Missouri the legal analysis may be
complicated by the First Amendment.
In addition to bolstering the rights of the proselytizing employee by adding
increased protection for free speech and unimpeded exercise of one's religious
beliefs,67 the First Amendment complicates the above scenarios because of the
Establishment Clause. The courts have construed the First Amendment's proscrip-
tion of the governmental establishment of a religion to include the appearance of
the adoption, promotion, or preference of any particular religion by public offi-
cials or employees acting in their official capacity. 68 This creates a potential con-
flict of legal responsibilities for the government employer. For this reason, in
59. See i& at 1339.
60. See id.
61. See id at 1342.
62. This particular case would likely come out the same even under the heightened undue
hardship standard of the WRFA because it was decided as much on the reasonableness of the
accommodation offered (covering the button while at work) as it was on the undueness of the
hardship to be created by complete tolerance of the button. See id. at 1342 & n.3.
63. See Hansen, supra note 1; Bencivenga, supra note 21.
64. See Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 58 F.3d at 1339. See also Wilson v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665,675 (D. Neb. 1994).
65. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 30.
66. See iS
67. See, e.g., Capitol Sq. Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); U.S.
CoNsr. amend. I. See also Clinton Guidelines, Section 2(A) & 2(E).
68. See Gumiaws, supra note 57, § 2(F).
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August 1997, the Clinton administration issued guidelines on religious exercise
and religious expression in the federal workplace. 69 Although limited to federal
employers, these guidelines provide much needed guidance to all government
employers.
3. Predictions
As religious observance is on the rise,70 more religious expression cases will
arise. The particular rise in the membership of religions that encourage or even
require proselytizing 71 promises even more conflicts of this sort. A careful balanc-
ing of employee rights is needed, particularly in government workplaces. Balanc-
ing the rights of one employee against those of another is tricky at best and seem-
ingly an unfair task to leave to individual employers. For this and other reasons, in
1993 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines
on workplace harassment.72 As discussed in Section III, although these guidelines
were ultimately withdrawn, they are sorely needed and likely to be reformulated
and reissued soon. EEOC guidelines would help define the parameters of prohib-
ited religious harassment, thereby instructing employers on how far to accommo-
date a proselytizer before that accommodation becomes the source of harassment
of other employees. The further legal obligations placed on government employ-
ers by the First Amendment require even more sophisticated balancing. The Clinton
guidelines should prove helpful in that arena.
Once again, employee claims are likely to decrease over time, despite increases
in proselytizing and the assertion of the right to do so. This is because employers
are likely to become more willing to accommodate proselytizing and other poten-
tially offensive expression of religious beliefs, as well as more adept at doing so.
In short, guidance provided to employers by the likely issuance of new EEOC
Guidelines, as well as that already available in the President's federal employer
guidelines, will enhance employers' willingness to accommodate.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FROM THE EEOC GUIDELINES TO CLINTON'S
GUIDELINES
Both the EEOC and the Clinton administration have attempted to provide some
much needed guidance to employers in this area. The EEOC attempt was effec-
tively blocked by the religious right,7 3 but Clinton's guidelines, whose drafters
seem to have considered the concerns of the earlier criticisms, have survived to
date.7 4
69. See GumELnms, supra note 57. See also Bencivenga, supra note 21 (noting that private
employers are also using the Guidelines as a template).
70. See Bencivenga, supra note 21.
71. See Hansen, supra note 1.
72. See discussion infra pp. 25-30.
73. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Harassment "More Equal?
26 SmEON HALL L. REv. 44, 73 (1995).
74. See Bencivenga, supra note 21.
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A. The EEOC Tries to Drav a Landscape
In 1993, largely in response to the amount of press and growing confusion
over the parameters of proscribed sexual harassment in the workplace,7 5 the EEOC
issued proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gen-
der, National Origin, Age, or Disability (EEOC Guidelines).7 6 The EEOC Guide-
lines caused quite a stir, leading to Congressional hearings, and eventually EEOC
withdrawal of the Guidelines in their entirety.77
The loudest objections to the EEOC Guidelines regarded the treatment of reli-
gious harassment.7 8 The primary area of criticism was the definition of harass-
ment, which was criticized as being too broad, such that almost any expression of
religious belief might constitute religious harassment. The proposed language pro-
vided:
Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or
aversion toward an individual because of his/her... religion.... or that of his/
her relatives, friends, or associates ....
Harassing conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) Epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating or hostile
acts that relate to ... religion .... and
(ii) Written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion to-
ward an individual or group because of... religion .... and that is placed on
walls, bulletin boards, or elsewhere on the employer's premises, or circulated
in the workplace.79
This broad definition, its critics feared, would create a "religion free" zone in
the workplace, infringing on religious liberty and potentially violating First Amend-
ment rights of both free speech and free exercise of religion--especially in a gov-
ernment workplace. 80 It was suggested that religious harassment be considered
separately by the EEOC Guidelines to address the special concerns of religious
liberty.8 1 Alternatively, it was suggested that religious harassment be edited out of
the proposed EEOC Guidelines entirely to be addressed later in a separate docu-
ment. 82 Ultimately, so much fervor was generated by the proposed EEOC Guide-
lines that the commissioners unanimously voted to withdraw them from consider-
ation.83
75. See Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 73, at 72-73 (citing reasons stated in EEOC Guidelines
themselves).
76. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion. Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
77. See Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 73, at 73. See also Betty L. Dunkum, Where to Draw
the Line: Handling Religious Harassment Issues in the Wake of the Failed EEOC Guidelines, 71
NoT'E D m L. REv. 953,954-57 (1996).
78. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 954-57; Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 73, at 73.
79. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 76, at 51,269.
80. See Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky
Line Benveen Healthy Expression and Unlawful Harassment, CoLui. J.L. & Soc. PRo3s. 39,55-
56 (1997); Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 73, at 75-76; Dunkum supra note 77, at 954-57.
81. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 954-57.
82. See id.; Schopf, supra note 80, at 57.
83. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 957; Dworkin & Peirce, supra note 73, at 73; Schopf,
supra note 80, at 56.
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Despite the political controversy they generated, the Guidelines were in fact
both constitutional and appropriate. They were nothing more than what they pur-
ported to be: an attempt to educate employers about already existing harassment
caselaw84 and to remind employers that Title VII affords parallel protection against
harassment based on race, color, religion and national origin as it does for sex. 85
While a redraft of the EEOC Guidelines might bein order to reflect more accu-
rately the now existing caselaw,86 their basic construct was, indeed, sound. The
definition of harassment sought to incorporate concepts articulated in sexual ha-
rassment caselaw87 and to extend the definition of hostile environment sexual ha-
rassment found in earlier guidelines to the other areas addressed by Title VII.88
This seems to be a useful paradigm, as it provides employers with some bound-
aries for accommodation of a proselytizing employee. Proselytizing becomes ille-
gal harassment when the religious expression creates an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment or unreasonably interferes with an individual's work per-
formance, as evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person.8 9 Revised
guidelines could provide examples drawn from caselaw illustrating that in deter-
mining when proselytizing becomes harassment, reasonable people typically con-
sider both the severity and the frequency of the offending conduct, as well as the
complaining employee's efforts, if any, to have the conduct stopped.9 0
In any case, though a political hot potato, the EEOC Guidelines are a much
needed tool for employers. The membership of the Commission has changed and
there is some indication that the new Commissioners will attempt to revise and to
reissue the Guidelines. 9 1 Perhaps the issuance of the federal employer guidelines
by the President will embolden the EEOC to act.
B. Clinton Guidelines Useful Though Limited to Federal Workers
On August 14, 1997 the White House issued Guidelines on Religious Exercise
and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Clinton Guidelines). 92 The
Clinton Guidelines are split largely into two sections:9 3 guidelines and guiding
legal principles. 94 The Clinton Guidelines, not unlike the withdrawn EEOC Guide-
84. See Hansen, supra note 1.
85. See id.
86. For example, Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), was decided after the EEOC
issued its guidelines. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 957-973 (discussing in detail the validity of
the EEOC Guidelines under existing harassment caselaw).
87. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 957.
88. See id.
89. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 76, at 51,269.
90. See Dunkum, supra note 77, at 964-66.
91. See Larry Witham, Work Rules on Religion Dropped, Wash. Times, Sept.21, 1994, at A l
(quoting a staff member on the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee as expressing
optimism that, with three new members joining the five-member commission, "the legal staff is
'likely to take a fresh crack at the issue'").
92. See Guidelines, supra note 57.
93. There is a third section but it is brief and insignificant to this discussion. See id. at § 3.
94. The section that sets out the guiding legal principles contains subsections discussing the
applicability of: the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; Title VII; the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution; the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment; and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This list
alone gives some indication of the complexity of this area of the law. See id. at § 2.
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lines, provide a summary of the relevant rules originated from caselaw. Then,
even more useful to the federal manager facing a conflict between rights of mul-
tiple employees, the Clinton Guidelines list specific examples of both acceptable
and proscribed activities.
The four Clinton Guidelines attempt to reconcile the various applicable laws
into an approach to workplace conflicts that strikes a balance between protecting
religious expression and avoiding religious harassment or violations of the Estab-
lishment Clause. For example, the first Clinton Guideline differentiates between
religious expression in private work areas, expression among fellow employees,
expression directed at fellow employees, and expression in areas accessible to the
public.9 5 In these latter two categories religious expression is still allowed but
with limitations. Section 1(A)(3) states that "employees must refrain from such
expression when a fellow employee asks that it stop or otherwise demonstrates
that it is unwelcome.' 96 Section 1(A)(4) advises that "all federal employees must
be sensitive to the Establishment Clause's requirement that expression not create
the reasonable impression that the government is sponsoring, endorsing, or inhib-
iting religion generally, or favoring or disfavoring a particular religion."97
A second Clinton Guideline sketches out the variety of types of outlawed reli-
gious discrimination, from religion as a term or condition of employment, to coer-
cion of employee participation or nonparticipation in religious activities, to hostile
work environment, and to religious harassment. 98 The third and fourth Clinton
Guidelines address, respectively, the accommodation requirement and the prohibi-
tion of the establishment of religion.99
The Clinton Guidelines are an admirable attempt to sketch the landscape of
religious discrimination law for federal employers. Of course, it is a landscape full
of mines since a little too much weight in one direction can trigger a violation of
Title VII or the First Amendment. Ultimately, only courts can say where to strike
the appropriate balance. The Clinton Guidelines themselves do not have the force
of law, and thus are useful only to the extent that they accurately summarize and
exemplify the existing law.1 00 There will, no doubt, be litigation to test the valid-
ity of the Clinton Guidelines' presentation of the law and modifications may re-
sult. Still, the Clinton Guidelines provide a model for the type of balancing that
must occur in any workplace between an individual's First Amendment and Tide
VII rights to religious expression and the rights of other workers to be free of
religious harassment or establishment.
IV. CONSITUTIONAL LAW: FROM SHERBERTTO FLORES
The United States Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue of religious
discrimination in the workplace, 10 1 so its decisions in this area offer limited guid-
ance on how to proceed with evolving modern cases. Here is what we know.
95. See id. at § I(A).
96. Id. at § I(A)(3).
97. Id. at § I(A)(4).
98. See id at § I(B).
99. See id. at §§ 1(C), (D).
100. See id. at § 3.
101. See generally William Bentley Ball, Supreme Court Review: Church/State Jurispru-
dence, 36 CAnT. LAW. 233 (1996).
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A. "Undue Hardship" and "Reasonable Accommodation" Construed
In 1977, the Court first interpreted Title VII's "reasonable accommodation
unless undue hardship" language and construed an "undue hardship" to be any-
thing more than "a de minimis cost," 102 thereby establishing a relatively light bur-
den of proof for an employer to meet. Nearly a decade later, the Court again
minimized an employer's obligations under Title VII when it determined that an
employer's only duty is to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious be-
liefs.1 03 The Court held that "any reasonable accommodation by the employer is
sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation," 104 and went on to state further
that the "employer need not further show that.., the employee's [preferred] alter-
native accommodations would result in undue hardship." 105 Taken together, these
precedents establish that an employer may avoid liability for religious discrimina-
tion under Title VII by offering proof either: that it attempted some reasonable
accommodation of the employee's religious needs (albeit not the accommodation
desired by the employee); or that no accommodation was offered because any such
accommodation would result in at least a de minimis cost to the employer. 106
Both of the aforementioned precedents dealt with employees whose religious
membership in the Worldwide Church of God required that they refrain from work
on certain holy days. 107 While the particular religion may not be considered a
traditional one, the type of claim certainly is. 10 8 Neither case negated the basic
claim that an employee's need for time off to honor religious holidays is the type
of religious belief which Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate,
absent a showing of undue hardship. What rendered each case a winner for the
employer was that, in the former case, the employee's request conflicted with a
collective bargaining agreement, 109 and the latter case involved a claim that the
employee's preferred resolution of the conflict should have been honored. 11 0
Neither case spoke to the more difficult problem of accommodating a belief in
the need to proselytize in the face of conflicting employee rights under the same
statute to be free of religious harassment.111 In addition, and perhaps more sig-
nificantly, both cases may be largely mooted by passage of the WRFA, which would
replace judicial definitions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship"
with congressional ones. 112
102. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
103. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
104. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 68-71.
107. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67; Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 62-63.
108. See discussion supra Section II.
109. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67- 68.
110. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 63-65.
111. See discussion supra pp. 17-19.
112. See Coats, supra note 16. Of course, the WRFA must not only pass but also pass
challenges to its constitutionality. However, unlike the RFRA, WRFA appears to be a perfectly
legitimate exercise of congressional authority because it seeks to bar future applications of Su-
preme Court holdings only to the extent that those holdings will conflict with now amended
statutory language. Congress may certainly amend or clarify its own language.
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B. Recent Ruling Invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Has little
Impact on Workplace Law
The Supreme Court has issued a controversial line of cases in the area of Free
Exercise. In 1963 the Court announced that the strict scrutiny standard of review
should be applied to laws which interfered with citizens' First Amendment right to
the free exercise of their religious beliefs. 113 This meant that when a law substan-
tially burdened a religious practice, that burden could only bejustified by a com-
pelling government interest. 114 In 1990, however, the Court declined to apply this
standard.
The 1990 case involved a challenge to an Oregon law which made use of the
drug peyote-a hallucinogen used by members of the Native American Church for
sacramental purposes-criminal, resulting in plaintiffs being denied unemploy-
ment benefits when they lost their jobs due to their peyote use. 115 In Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court distinguished its prior holding by limiting its applica-
tion to laws targeting particular religious practices, in contrast to laws of general
applicability which incidentally burden exercise of a religious belief.116 Since the
Oregon statute was one of general applicability, the Court held that a more relaxed
standard of review was appropriate, lest many Americans assert religious views as
reason to disobey neutral, generally applicable "prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct." 1 17 In direct response to this apparent change in the law, Congress passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 118
The RFRA acknowledges that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may substan-
tially burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with reli-
gious exercise."' 119 It then declared that "governments should not substantially
burden religious exercise without compelling justification." 120 The RFRA sought
"to restore the compelling interest test ' 12 1 which it defined as follows:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
113. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
114. See id at 403.
115. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
116. Id. at 885. The Smith ruling came despite the fact that in 1972 the Court had appeared to
follow the Sherbert holding in analyzing a statute of general applicability. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Wisconsin r. Yoder, the Court struck down a Wisconsin manda-
tory school attendance law as it applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to
send their children to school. See id at 234. The Court held that the state statute impermissibly
infringed upon the Amish plaintiffs' rights to exercise their religious beliefs. See id. The Smith
decision distinguished Yoder as implicating multiple rights and thus warranting higher scrutiny
than other general laws implicating only free exercise of religion. See Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. See also City of Boerne v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157,2161 (1997).
117. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
118. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1993)
[hereinafter RFRA].
119. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(2).
120. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(3).
121. Id. at § 2000bb(b)(1).
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(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least intrusive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest. 122
In June of 1997, the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional. 12 3 Con-
gress had justified its attempt to directly overrule the Supreme Court on an issue of
constitutional interpretation by claiming to exercise its authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to enforce the Free Ex-
ercise guarantee as it applies to the states. 124 The Supreme Court disagreed, hold-
ing that Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting RFRA because it was
seeking to change or define the substance of the Free Exercise clause rather than
merely to enforce it. 125
This line of cases has limited impact on religious discrimination in the work-
place. Smith was, at best, indirectly a workplace case, implicating workplace rights
not as a challenge to the plaintiffs' dismissal for exercising their religious beliefs,
but rather, only as a challenge to-plaintiffs' rights to collect unemployment. 126
Should RFRA be redrafted and re-passed, it would restrict government employers
from burdening the exercise of employee religious practices only in those situa-
tions where the government employer could point to a compelling governmental
interest. It would not similarly affect private employers. Therefore, employees in
the private sector would not gain any additional workplace rights as a result of
RFRA. As for the government employee, it is questionable whether RFRA would
provide more protection than Title VII, which already requires that all employers
reasonably accommodate employees' religious beliefs and practices. Possibly, it
would provide an alternative way to strengthen the undue hardship standard, but
this may well be accomplished sooner and more broadly by passage of the ,WRFA,
a more constitutionally sound exercise of congressional authority. 127
V. CONCLUSION
Several factors will contribute to the continued increase of workplace reli-
gious discrimination claims in the next decade. Economic indicators are good,
which means that workers are more willing to risk their current jobs. Thus, they
are more likely to demand what they perceive as "fair" treatment in the workplace,
including accommodation of religious beliefs and observances. Participation in
religious observances and activities is rising so more Americans are actively par-
ticipating in religious practices and holidays. This means that more workers are
likely to develop conflicts between workplace policies and religious beliefs and
observances. The workforce is growing ever more diverse while many managers
remain unfamiliar with the myriad of religious beliefs and observances of employ-
ees. Hence, managers may unwittingly create litigation despite company policies
122. Id. at § 2000bb-l(b).
123. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Employment Div., Oregon Dept of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-
83 (1990).
127. See Coats, supra note 16.
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in favor of accommodating religious beliefs and observances. WRFA is likely to
pass, which will toughen the standard for the statutory employer defense of "un-
due hardship." Employers will no longer be legally excused from accommodating
employee religious beliefs and observances whenever doing so would create a
minimal expense or inconvenience. Instead, they will have to demonstrate a "sig-
nificant" difficulty or expense.
In the long term, the number of lawsuits will likely decrease as employers
grow ever more accommodating of employee beliefs and practices. This will hap-
pen as employer awareness of diverse beliefs increases. In addition, employers
will become more accommodating as the costs of defending and losing lawsuits
grow and as employers become more sensitive to the cost of bad publicity in an era
when public opinion supports employee rights. 128 Driven largely by economic
factors, employers will yield to these popular demands and workplace religious
freedom in the new millennium will reach new heights.
The biggest challenge for the next century in this area of employment law
promises to be striking a balance between the rights of employees to speak, preach,
or proselytize about their religious beliefs and the right of employees to be free
from religious harassment in the workplace. The Clinton Guidelines are a first
step in calibrating that scale, but caselaw alone can flush out the appropriate mix.
It promises to be an interesting journey.
128. See Brian O'Reilly, The New Deal: What Companies and Employees Owe OneAnother,
Fotma, June 13, 1994, at 44 (detailing surveys and studies of employee attitudes about what
employers ought to give employees, especially if they want loyalty).

